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OIL CONSERVATION IN A NEW SETTING*
WALLACE F. LOVEJOYt
I
THE CHANGED SETTING

The much maligned and misunderstood mechanism of state oil
conservation is once again being criticized. While in the past the
major critics have been those who have felt that this device creates
a legalized cartel and unnecessarily high, albeit stable, prices,1 today
the criticism is coming more from within the industry than from
without, and from regulatory authorities directly and indirectly
concerned with the oil industry. There is, for example, a broad
study of oil and gas conservation regulation currently being undertaken by the Interstate Oil Compact Commission (I.O.C.C.).

2

The

Secretary of the Interior in a letter to the I.O.C.C. in the spring
of 1963 voiced his concern over unsolved problems in conservation:
The total crude supply available for domestic use is made up of
domestic production and imports. The major component is domestic
production which is subject to a supply control system based upon
state statutes. Several factors have worked together to limit the effectiveness of their control system. Among these are the status
of state regulatory statutes in light of present day technology, the
limited participation of some producing states, and the increased
3
flexibility of interstate purchasing and transportation facilities.
An interagency committee on petroleum of the Federal Government added its voice in the concern:
* This paper presents some of the work undertaken by the Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University under a research grant from Resources for the

Future, Inc., Washington, D.C., to study the economics of petroleum conservation. The
author is indebted to Professor Paul T. Homan for his comments, criticism, and
suggestions.
t Professor of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
1. Rostow, A National Policy for the Oil Industry (1948)
de Chazeau & Kahn,

Integration and Competition in the Petroleum Industry (1959)

Watkins, Oil: Stabili-

zation or Conservation? (1937).

2. Report and Address of the Chairman of the Interstate Oil Compact Comm'n,
Midyear Meeting, New Orleans, June 13-15, 1963.
3.

U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Press Release setting forth letter from the Secretary

of the Interior to Governor Matthew E. Welsh, Chairman of the Interstate Oil Compact Comm'n, April 4, 1963.
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It is now clear that several factors have seriously distorted the

regulatory system and decreased its effectiveness to adequately serve
either Federal or State objective.
It is recommended that the Secretary of the Interior be requested
to undertake discussion with the [Interstate Oil Compact] Commission, looking toward the formation of a working group to con-

sider objectively
the problems involved in updating the control
4
system.

Individual regulatory authorities and industry representatives
have issued numerous statements attacking what they consider to be
defects in the existing system. A list of these statements includes
pleas for well spacing regulations to eliminate the drilling of unnecessary wells, for more uniformity among states in proration
formulas, for changes in proration yardsticks or depth factors in
allowables, for more favorable or less favorable treatment of pressure maintenance projects in proration, for clarification of the role
of "maximum efficient rates" of production (MER's) in proration,
for compulsory pooling of drilling units, for compulsory unitization
of producing units, for a system of "fair sharing" among producing
states of the nation's total production, and for ratable-take regulations in gas production. The American Petroleum Institute recently
issued a statement in which it noted the groundswell of discontent:
To meet growing future requirements [for oil and gas] ; continued
progress in technology and operating practices will be needed and
substantial improvements in conservation practices and regulations
will be imperative.5 [Emphasis added.]

It is quite clear that agitation for reform in oil and gas conservation today is probably greater than it has been since the early 1930's,
when the foundations of modern regulation were laid.6
4. United States Petroleum Study Committee, A Report to the President 4-5
(1962) (mimeo.).
5. American Petroleum Institute, Statement of Policy: Conservation, Development
and Production Practices 3 (1963).
6. The criticism of the conservation regulation system by academic economists
has not ceased. See, e.g., Davidson, Public Policy Problems of the Domestic Crude Oil
Industry, 53 American Economic Rev. 85 (1963) ; Comments on this article by D. R. G.
Campbell and by Henry Steele and Davidson's Reply, 54 American Economic Rev.
114, 119, 125 (1964) ; Adelman, The World Oil Outlook in Natural Resources and International Development (Resources for the Future, Inc., 1964); Adelman, Efficiency
of Resource Use in Crude Petroleum, paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Economic Ass'n, Boston, December 29, 1963.
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What has caused this new push for reform? Several factors seem
to stand out. There is a growing realization that much of the oil
produced in the United States is high cost relative to that produced
in many other parts of the world. Being the high cost competitor in
your own backyard market is always an uncomfortable position.
It means that additional profits for domestic producers cannot come
from higher prices but rather must come either from cost savings
or from recapturing, through a tighter import control system, part
of the domestic market which is now supplied from foreign sources.
Related to this is the realization that no individual state is the
"balance wheel" in equating domestic supply and demand, which,
as Erich Zimmermann argued, was the role Texas played until recently. 7 Oil imports are probably the closest thing to a balance wheel
in the domestic industry, and these controls are set by the President with no legislative limitations.' The price ceiling implications
of this situation are obvious and are made firmer by the presence
of oil shale which threatens to become a serious competitor in the
near future.
Adding to the price-cost dilemma is the problem of domestic
"excess producing capacity." In 1960 the National Petroleum Council (N.P.C.) estimated that, for the nation as a whole, 12,383,000
barrels per day of crude oil and natural gas liquids could be produced, while production itself was running at about 8,353,000
barrels per dayY The fact that the major "market demand" states
are currently producing prorated wells at far below efficient capacity
rates is concrete evidence of the overcapacity situation. The overcapacity situation is complicated by the fact that the ratio of current production to proved reserves has remained relatively constant while producing capacity has been rising.
Herein lies the nub of the current problem of conservation regulation reform. One unnamed state regulator summed this up neatly
in a comment that went something like this:
7. Zimmermann, Conservation in the Production of Petroleum 213-26 (1957).
8. The Trade Agreements Extensiou' Act of 1958 (Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act) P. L. 85-686, §§3, 8(a), 72 Stat. 673, 678 (1958), as amended, P. L. 87-794,
§ 257, 76 Stat. 881-2 (1962), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351, 1352a (Supp. V, 1964), gives the President the power to set any import level he thinks is necessary to achieve the objectives
of the Act. Adequate petroleum supplies and reasonable consumer prices are among
the prime objectives. The Act places ne absolute barrel limitations and no limitation
such as a percentage of the domestic market on imports. See also Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, P.L. 87-794, §§ 101-258, 76 Stat. 872-83 (1962), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-88
(Supp. V, 1964).
9. Most of the excess capacity is in Petroleum Administration for Defense District
3: Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Alabama.
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The drastic market demand restrictions of the degree we have had
to make in the past two years underlie most of our problems. Some
operators feel they are being treated unfairly and suggest changes.
These suggested changes are objected to by others who claim that they
will then be treated unfairly. When everyone produces at near
capacity no one complains very much. When the market is slack
everyone blames the other fellow.

Since the domestic producing industry appears destined to have
considerable excess producing capacity for many years to come
(barring an emergency situation which severely restricts imports),
the industry as well as many regulatory authorities are calling for
adjustments in conservation regulations to fit the new situation. The
existing regulations operate fairly effectively in the context of demand nearly equalling production at rates restricted only by efficiency considerations. The major evils sought to be corrected by
these regulations were: (1) unrestrained production, which caused
both underground and above-ground waste, and (2) drainage
caused by non-ratable production. New regulations are needed which
operate in a context of demand substantially less than production
at efficient rates, and which still accomplish the conservation goals
of preventing unnecessary waste and protecting correlative rights
in the field.
The following discussion will attempt to outline some of the
areas in which the new set of circumstances threatens to make
existing patterns of regulation obsolete. The regulatory experience
of Texas will be used primarily in the discussion, although much of
what is said can be broadly applied to most states. Some tentative
suggestions will be made for bringing regulation out of the past
and making it more effective in the new circumstances. These comments are made with the clear realization that there is no easy
solution which will not hurt someone, and that any solution will
be painfully slow in coming.
In any industry which has been regulated for an extended period,
a group of institutions and practices evolve based, among other
things, on the regulations. The current posture of the industry is a
product of its history. This is often overlooked by critics who propose radical changes. The behavior of individuals and companies
is conditioned by the "rules of the game," and more importantly,
such behavior is a continuum over time involving decisions today
based on expectations that existing institutions and regulations will
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not change greatly in the future. Once an industry has been built,
based in part on a set of regulations, it becomes exceedingly difficult politically and economically to change. If changes in regulations
are to occur, they must be made at some point in time; yet any time,
from someone's viewpoint, will be the wrong time. If oil wells were
fully depleted in six months, or if investments were paid out in this
industry in a year or so, the transition could be made much more
easily. This is not the case, however, and there cannot be a moratorium on all activity in the industry so that it can, in a sense, start
over. It is far easier to build an ideal structure of regulations where
none exists than it is to build a new structure in a situation in which
an old structure must first be torn down. And it is difficult to salvage
the good parts of an old system to put them in a new one, since the
parts are designed to fit together in a workable whole.
II
OVERCAPACITY AND PRORATION

While this is not the place to examine the question of the extent
and location of overcapacity in oil production in detail, it is necessary to show that this poses a serious problem which is apt to be
long run rather than short run in nature. We are concerned here
particularly with the major oil producing states which practice
"market demand" proration. 1°
The demand for energy in the United States during the post war
years has grown at a rapid rate, but not all types of energy have
shared equally in this growth. Competition among fuels in several
major markets has resulted in shifts among fuel users. Coal clearly
has been hit hardest with the loss of most of its heating and railroad
fuel markets and a shrinkage in its industrial market. Fuel oil consumption has grown slowly because of competition from natural
gas. Crude oil has also experienced market losses to natural gas
liquids for refinery feed stocks. Coupled with this domestic competition, United States oil producers have lost their dominant
world position, and this country has switched from a major oil exporting nation to a major oil importing nation. The 1962 United
States demand for liquid hydrocarbons was about 10,234,000"
barrels daily. This was supplied from the following sources: domes10. This term is used to describe a regulatory system which restricts output to
estimated consumption.
11. Table I to U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1962 Annual Petroleum Statement (1963).
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tic crude oil, about 70 per cent; domestic natural gas liquids, about
10 per cent; and imports of crude oil and products, about 20 per
cent.
Despite early signs of this overcapacity situation, domestic companies rapidly expanded their exploratory and development efforts
in post war years so that in January, 1951, the N.P.C. reported
producing capacity for crude oil and gas liquids at 7,300,000 barrels2
daily, and by 1960 this had risen to 12,383,000 barrels daily.'

Producing capacity and actual production for 1960 by P.A.D.
Districts is shown in Table I. The major area of excess capacity is
found in District III-including Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico
and Mississippi.
This fact is also borne out in state producing rates. Texas is currently producing its "prorated wells"'13 at a rate of about 28 per
cent of their schedule daily allowables, Oklahoma is producing its
allocated wells at about 30 per cent, and Louisiana is producing at
about 33 per cent of its depth-factor allowables. In every case these
percentage figures overstate the degree of restriction because the
prorated wells could not produce their full allowables on a sustained basis. However, even allowing for a 50 per cent understatement of the production rate to true efficient capacity, the degree of
restriction is severe.
This overcapacity will not disappear overnight or even in a few
years. If we postulate a "normal" decline in producing capacity of
8 per cent per year of all wells currently in existence with no new
wells drilled, and imports remaining at about current levels, it would
probably take about 4 or 5 years for capacity to decline to a level
equal to current demand for domestic oil. As long as new drilling
adds new capacity as fast as old capacity is declining, we must rely
on growth in the demand for domestic oil to reduce excess capacity.
If it is assumed that new drilling maintains the current level of
capacity, and demand for domestic crude oil is growing at from 1 Y
to 2Y2 per cent a year, this means it would take at least 15 years for
demand to catch up with the current level of producing capacity.
To the extent that new drilling adds to existing capacity, net of
the natural decline, the time required for growth in demand to
absorb the excess capacity is lengthened.
12. Table 6 to National Petroleum Council, Petroleum Productive Capacity (1952)
National Petroleum Council, Proved Petroleum and Natural Gas Reserves and

Availability 4 (1961). Data for Natural Gas Liquids in 1960 are somewhat overstated
compared to the 1951 data due to changes in definitions.
13. This term will be fully discussed infra.
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The state restrictions noted above do not fall equally on all producing wells in a state, but rather they fall almost entirely on the
relatively flush or prolific wells. Thus one hears cries of anguish
from operators of these wells claiming that regulation discriminates
against them. At 80 to 90 per cent producing rates, these cries
would be rarely heard. Let us look at Texas in some detail to
determine precisely how the system works in allocating production
among classes of wells and pools within the state.
TABLE I
UNITED STATES CRUDE OIL PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY

14

AND PRODUCTION'

5

(THOUSANDS OF BARRELS DAILY)

P.A.D.

Productive

Production

Excess

Production as

District

Capacity
Jan. 1, 1960

Average for
1959 & 1960

Production

per cent of
Capacity

1
2
3
4
5
Total U.S.

29
1,555
7,331
664
1,006
10,585

29
1,334
4,168
672
842
7,045

0
221
3,163
-8
164
3,540

100.0
85.8
56.9
101.2
83.7
66.6

The Texas system divides wells into exempt and non-exempt
categories. The exempt categories include the following:
(1) Discovery wells which have special "yardstick"' 6 allowables
depending on depth, but which are exempt from market demand
restrictions. Oil wells drilled in a new field or pool can produce this
special allowable until the sixth well has been completed or for
eighteen months from the time the initial well is assigned an allow17
able, whichever occurs first.
(2) Marginalwells are defined as marginal by statute' and are
entirely exempt from production restrictions. A well producing 10
14. From Table IF to National Petroleum Council, Proved Petroleum and Natural
Gas Reserves and Availability (1961).
15. From Table 4 to U.S. Bureau of Mines, Crude Petroleum and Petroleum
Products: 1960, Annual Petroleum Statement No. 473 (1961) (mimeo.).
16. The term "yardstick" is explained infra.
17. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, Special Order No. 20-29, 540, effective June 1,
1954.

18. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6049b (1948).

OCTOBER, 1964]

OIL CONSERVATION IN A NEW SETTING

339

barrels per day or less from a depth of 2,000 or less is marginal;
as is a well producing 20 barrels per day from 2,000 to 4,000 feet,
or 25 barrels per day from 4,00 to 6,000 feet, or 30 barrels per
day from 6,000 to 8,000 feet, or 35 barrels per day from over
8,000 feet. Entire fields may be marginal, or a flush field may have
a few marginal wells.
(3) Wells in capacity water flood (secondary recovery) projects
are usually allowed to produce at capacity with no market demand
restrictions. Also, the "County Regular" fields are not restricted.
These are small, relatively shallow fields in Railroad Commission
Districts 7B and 9 (North Central Texas) which often produce at
rates high enough to disqualify them from the marginal well category but at rates substantially below the "yardstick" allowable
usually applied to non-exempt wells. These fields are considered to
be in the stripper category and thus exempt from production restrictions. In addition there are a few other minor categories of exempt
wells. The term "marginal" may be properly applied to statutory
marginal wells, wells in capacity water flood projects, and wells in
"County Regular" fields.
The remaining wells in Texas are subject to market demand
restrictions. This includes fields with pressure maintenance projects,
although such projects are usually given a bonus allowable related
to the amount of water or gas injected. After a new field goes off
the discovery allowable, it is given a "yardstick" allowable. The
"yardstick" is set forth in Table II. This sets the maximum schedule
daily allowable that can be produced for fields of various depths
drilled on different spacing patterns. Some fields get special exceptions granted in determining allowable because of special conditions.
These may be lumped together and labelled M.E.R. allowable
fields. The market demand percentage is then applied to the yardstick or M.E.R. allowable to determine how much a field can produce in a given month. Thus, a 4,000 to 5,000 foot well on fortyacre spacing with a 28 per cent market demand factor can produce
about 26 barrels per day (92 X .28=26.04) according to the
"yardstick." The fact that a statutory marginal well at this depth
may produce up to 25 barrels per day is sufficient to indicate why
operators of flush wells often feel treated unfairly.
In April, 1963, production in Texas from exempt wells was as
follows :,9
19. Records of the Railroad Comm'n of Texas.
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Total Exempt Production
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112,821 BD
412,260 BD
688,772 BD
1,213,853 BD

The remaining wells in Texas which were subject to market demand restrictions had a schedule daily allowable of about 5,734,481
barrels per day, based primarily on the yardstick, i.e., this would
be the theoretical maximum allowed production with no market
demand restriction. ° It is difficult to determine accurately what the
sustainable productive capacity for these wells is, but it is probably
in the range of from 3,650,000 to 3,700,000 barrels per day. In
April, 1963, the total state allowable production of exempt and
non-exempt wells was about 2,819,000 barrels per day, of which
1,214,000 barrels per day came from exempt wells. This left wells
capable of producing about 3,700,000 barrels per day actually
producing about 1,605,000 barrels per day or at about 43 per cent
of true efficient capacity.
It is situations such as this, for which producers see no hope in
the near future for improvement, that cause much of the unrest
and dissatisfaction with the current regulatory framework. The
regulatory authorities are restive also because they feel caught in
an uncomfortable and unpopular position from which escape seems
hopeless. What, if anything, can be done at the state level to bring
"fairer" treatment of all groups regulated, and what can be done
to ease pressures caused by delayed revenues from stretched out
production ?
III
POSSIBLE CHANGES IN PRORATION REGULATION IN TEXAS
It should be pointed out at the outset that a state commission
in attempting to deal with the overcapacity problem can work only
with supply; it has little if anything to do with demand. It should
also be noted that each state in manipulating its own supply works
20. Some flush fields are allocated by special order of the Commission on the basis
of maximum efficient rates of production rather than the yardstick. It is impossible to
separate the amount of production of fields using the M.E.R. basis from fields using
the yardstick. Also, the big East Texas Field, except for statutory marginal wells in
the field, produces under a special order which is not based on the yardstick.
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TABLE II
THE TEXAS

1947

YARDSTICK

21

Daily Schedule Allowable (Barrels)
Depth

(feet)
0- 1,000
1,000- 1,500
1,500- 2,000
2,000- 3,000
3,000- 4,000

4,000- 5,000
5,000- 6,000
6,000- 7,000
7,000- 8,000
8,000- 8,500
8,500- 9,000
9,000- 9,500
9,500-10,000
10,000-10,500
10,500-11,000
11,000-11,500
11,500-12,000
12,000-12,500
12,500-13,000
13,000-13,500
13,500-14,000
14,000-14,500

10-Acre Units
18
27
36
45
54
63
72
81
91
103
112
127
152
190

20-Acre Units
28
37
46
55
64
73
82
91
101
113
122
137
162
210
225
255
290
330
375
425
480
540

40-Acre Units

in the context of all other producing states, some of which have
overcapacity also. Several alternatives come to mind for a state
such as Texas.
One alternative might be to increase allowables on restricted
production even though the market demand does not seem to warrant it. This has at least two possible repercussions distasteful to
almost everyone in the industry. Buyers would probably institute
"purchaser proration" which may result in the same amount of oil
being taken as before, but now under purchaser restriction or proration rather than state restriction. Such a system is susceptible to
abuse and can easily result in discrimination by purchasers among
21. From Rule 45(A), Recompilation of Rules and Regulations for the Railroad
Comm'n of Texas, Oil and Gas Div., 1963 Statewide Rules.
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producers within fields and among fields which would be difficult to
detect and police. A second possible effect would be a price reduction for crude oil in the field. With allowed production in excess
of demand, there would probably be downward price pressures
that would be difficult to resist. Such pressures might originate on
either the buying or the selling side. The temptations to shave prices
in a surplus situation are considerable. If prices did drop, it might
very well happen that when prices once more stabilized many producers would be selling little or no more crude oil but at lower
prices. Perhaps a longer run effect of lower prices would be to drive
some marginal production out of business and thus make more
room for additional flush production. It is apt also to slow down
investments in pressure maintenance and secondary recovery projects which are being contemplated. None of these results is likely to
be looked upon with favor by state regulatory authorities or by
the industry. Nor is it clear that the public would benefit in the long
run.
Another alternative might be to start applying some restrictions
to exempt wells so that they share the burden. For example, the
statutory definition of marginal wells could be changed, which would
take some production out of this category. The same could be done
for County Regular fields and capacity water flood projects in the
state. There are many marginal wells, including wells in the County
Regular or capacity water flood fields, that produce enough oil to
more than cover their costs of production plus a reasonable profit.
They are, in other words, far above a break-even point of production. A possible solution would be to repeal the statutory definition
of marginal wells and leave to the discretion of the Commission the
level of production which is to be allowed from the wells that are
currently in this category. The criteria for an allowable under this
system would be economic, i.e., how much production is needed in a
field or well to generate sufficient revenues to cover the costs of
operating the field or well and yield a reasonable profit. Cost and
revenue determinations would have to be made for each field or
each well. In the case of fields made up entirely of marginal wells
(in the broad meaning of this term), the economic determinations
should be on a field basis. This would require unit operations of the
field, which in itself is a major stumbling block to adopting any
such system. For marginal wells in flush fields, the economic determinations would have to be on an individual well basis.
The flexibility in this suggested change would enable the Com-
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mission to keep alive the marginal wells but would permit the
Commission to force these wells to bear some of the restriction
caused by overcapacity. It would have the beneficial side effect of
eliminating what are currently clear cases of legalized drainage of
neighboring properties by marginal wells in flush fields. There exist
today situations in which marginal wells in flush fields are allowed,
by statute, to produce more than neighboring non-marginal wells
subject to market demand restriction. The result is quite often that
the marginal well recovers far more oil than the original recoverable
reserves in place under the marginal well lease.
A less drastic change would be to adopt a system similar to that
used in Oklahoma. Oklahoma regulations allow marginal wells to
produce no more than the lowest allowable for restricted wells.
Thus, if the lowest allowable on prorated wells is 8 barrels per day
with a market demand restriction of 30 per cent of the top well
allowable, which was the case in the summer of 1963, no marginal
well could produce in excess of 8 barrels daily. If the market demand restriction eased so that the lowest allowable was 10 barrels
daily, the top allowable for marginal wells would rise to 10 barrels
22
daily.
On the other hand, the sort of system suggested above which
leaves marginal well production to the discretion of the Commission would involve the Commission in cost analysis to a far greater
extent than is now undertaken. The Commission would be loathe
to add this tremendous task to its already overworked staff. Possible litigation under this system might be staggering. Also, it
would require legislation that would be unpopular with large numbers of operators and royalty owners so that the political forces
opposing it would have an excellent chance of defeating such a proposal. Yet, some restriction of marginal well production is certainly
called for.
Some changes could also be made in discovery allowables which
might free production for non-exempt wells. The existing regulations
have a yardstick for discovery wells based on depth but with no adjustments for different well-spacing patterns. This yardstick is
roughly comparable to the yardstick for forty-acre spacing for non22. The Oklahoma Rules provide that "The maximum per well allowable for unallocated pools shall be equal . . . to the basic minimum allowable for allocated pools
. . . and shall be subject to market demand fluctuation upon the same basis as the
minimum allocated pool allowable . . . ." Rule 303-2-A, Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, General Rules and Regulations, as amended (1961).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

['VOL. 4

exempt wells.23 It might be feasible to make the discovery well yardstick double what it currently is at all depths, but apply the market
demand factor to these wells. This would probably reduce incentives
for exploration. Production from exploratory wells would feel
market demand fluctuations. The amount of production transferred
would not be great since discovery wells produce only about 100,-

000 to 150,000 barrels daily. However, such a system would have
the added benefit of providing smaller incentives for discovery at
times when market demand restriction was greatest and thus at times
when additions to productive capacity are least desirable.
Whether any state would ever want to dampen discovery efforts
intentionally is doubtful. Also, any attempt to reduce a given
state's producing capacity might backfire in that it might merely

mean a reduction inthat state's market demand to the benefit of
neighboring states. In such a situation the cuts in exempt production might very well be partially transferred out of state rather
than to the non-exempt production within the state. For example,
pipelines connected to County Regular fields in North Central Texas
might take oil from Oklahoma fields if production in the County
Regular fields were reduced. It is conceivable that co-operation
among neighboring states could prevent such shifts between states,
and allow the cuts in exempt-well production to accrue to nonexempt wells in each state. Past experience indicates that co-operation of this sort would be difficult to achieve, since it would require
a substantial uniformity of regulations among states. It is conceivable, however, that this could occur, and the Interstate Oil
Compact Commission could very well be the vehicle for achieving
the desired uniformity.
IV
OTHER AREAS OF POSSIBLE REFORM

A completely different line of attack is open to the states which
does not go directly to the overcapacity problem but which could
improve the health of the industry within each state. This is an
attack on the cost problems of the industry through changes in such
things as well-spacing requirements, proration formulas, unitization
and pooling requirements, and the like. This approach is already
23. The discovery well yardstick is lower than 100 per cent of the regular yardstick for wells under 4,000 feet, greater for wells from 4,000 to 10,000 feet, and less
for wells over 10,000 feet.
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being tried piecemeal in several states. Recently collected data reveal three significant trends :24 (1) well spacing in new fields is
getting wider and wider with 40-acre units becoming the minimum
size in some states and with 80-acre and even 160-acre drilling units
for oil becoming more and more common; (2) proration formulas
for new fields are de-emphasizing the well factor and are moving
toward 100 per cent acreage and in some instances 100 per cent acre
feet; (3) while there have been relatively few changes in compulsory unitization regulations and their application (except in Louisiana where such a law was adopted in 1960), there is an obvious
trend toward voluntary unitization and pool co-operation among
operators. These are all encouraging signs which, given time, will
help reduce unnecessary drilling in new pools and will help reduce
costs or at least keep them from being as high as they otherwise
might be in these new pools. They will not, however, put a significant dent in excess producing capacity and will not, in themselves,
alleviate the pressing problem of heavy production restrictions on
existing wells. They should be urged, however, for the simple reason
that they will eventually put producers in a better position to
weather what seems to be an inevitable cost-revenue squeeze in the
future.
Certain changes along the lines noted above would not only result in a significant future cost saving to the industry as a whole,
but would also help to eliminate what appear to be inequities in
the present system which often become accentuated during periods
of severe market demand restrictions.
Part of the well-spacing problem in Texas appears on the way
to being solved. Under present regulations the Railroad Commission has the power to suggest, but cannot require, drilling units in
situations involving small tracts. 2 5 Under Rule 37 anyone wishing

to drill on acreage less than the size of the suggested drilling unit
24. This information is from preliminary data gathered by the Interstate Oil Compact Commission's Governors' Study Committee (Efficiency Study Committee) and will
be reported in detail in the findings of this committee, scheduled for release in
December, 1964.
25. Rule 37 of the Texas Railroad Commission establishes 40 acres as the statewide spacing rule, but it also provides (1) that the Rule shall not apply to salt dome
fields and (2) that owners of leases on "small tracts" are allowed to drill a well as an
exception to Rule 37 if the tract is part of a subdivision set up before the general
spacing order went into effect in the specific area concerned. However, under Rules
38, 39, 40 and 45, the Commission has the power to establish proration or production

units and to set allowables for each such unit. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, Recompilation of Rules and Regulations for the Railroad Comm'n of Texas, Oil and Gas Div.

(1964).
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may do so. Until recently such an operator could expect a special
allowable which would enable him to recover his investment and a
fair return. With the Halbouty, Atlantic, Shell, and 41coa decisions
in the Texas courts, 26 the small tract operator can expect an allowable which will enable him to recover only the oil or gas under his
tract, regardless of whether this allowable enables him to pay for his
well. These decisions appear to assure passage of a compulsory
pooling bill in the next session of the Texas Legislature, and such
a bill now seems to have the backing of the Texas Independent
Producers and Royalty Owners Association (TIPRO) and the
Committee for Equitable Development of Texas Oil and Gas Resources (CEDOT), two powerful groups of independent oil operators. A compulsory pooling law is essential to prevent the drilling of
unnecessary wells. It is also important to assure the small tract
owner of his fair share of oil and to assure the large tract owner
of protection from drainage by the small tract well. 27 All major
producing states except Texas, California, and Kansas have laws
for compulsory pooling of drilling units.
There also appear to be encouraging signs in establishing wider
well spacing for new fields. Temporary spacing orders for 320 acres
have been issued in Texas, and 160-acre spacing is no longer a
rarity. Louisiana, New Mexico, and Oklahoma are doing much the
same thing. This type of spacing early in the life of a field is
especially appealing because infill drilling can be done if it is later
decided that closer spacing is the optimum pattern. Wells can never
be "undrilled," but they can always be drilled.
Another powerful deterrent to excessive drilling that can be used
by a regulatory commission is an allocation formula based on 100
per cent acreage or 100 per cent acre-feet of recoverable reserves.
This tool was mentioned above in connection with compulsory pooling of drilling units. The various regulatory agencies have in recent
years, been giving less and less weight to the number of wells on a
producing unit for setting allowables, but there is still much to be
done in this area. For example, the "1947 Yardstick" which is used
in Texas to establish schedule daily allowables, found in Table II,
26. Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex. 417, 357 S.W.2d 364 (1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 162 Tex. 274,
346 S.W.2d 801 (1961); Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 369 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963); Railroad Comm'n v. Aluminum Co. of America, 368 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1963).
27. See Hardwicke & Woodward, Fair Share and the Small Tract in Texas, 41
Texas L. Rev. 75 (1962), for an excellent discussion of the small tract problem in Texas.
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gives larger allowables to wells on wider spacing patterns at any
given depth and also larger allowables to wells of greater depth
on any given spacing pattern. The 10-acre pattern is the basic
allowable for any depth; one barrel per additional acre is added
for wider spacing. If a yardstick system is to be used, in order to be
more consistent with conservation philosophy, larger than 10-acre
spacing should be accorded the proper multiple of the basic allowable-20 acres having a multiple of two, 40 acres a multiple of
four, and so on. The Texas Commission currently has its yardstick
under review with an eye toward giving more weight to the acreage
factor.
The final aspect of conservation regulation which should be mentioned is unit operations of producing units. For a number of years
petroleum engineers have known that more oil can be recovered at
lower costs if a pool can be produced as a single unit rather than
on a fragmented lease basis. Virtually all states have voluntary
unitization regulations to allow operators to join their properties
by mutual agreement. Oklahoma, Louisiana and five other less important states have "compulsory" unitization laws which provide
for unit operations to be ordered by the regulatory body."' Unit
operations, both voluntary and compulsory, are of growing importance in the drive to cut costs and increase ultimate recovery. Some
progress has been made in all states in this direction. However,
there is much left to be done, and compulsory unitization laws are
probably a necessity. There is understandable reluctance, particularly among small operators, to place in the hands of regulatory
bodies the decisions on shares of costs and production from unit
operations. Rightly or wrongly, many operators feel that such a
system would not give them their "fair share," or more accurately
perhaps, that the commission's concept of fairness might differ from
28. The statutes of the several states vary as to the specific form compulsory unitization takes. Alabama [Ala. Code tit. 26, §179(73) (1958)], Arkansas [Ark. Stat.
Ann. §53-115(C-1 to -17) (Supp. 1963)1, and Louisiana [La. Rev. Stat. §30:5(C)
(Supp. 1963)] require that the royalty and working interest owners of 75 per cent
of the area to be unitized agree to the unit plan. Oklahoma [Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52,
§ 287.5 (Supp. 1963)] requires that the owners of 63 per cent of the area agree.
Florida [Fla. Stat. §377.28 (1960)], Michigan [Mich. Stat. Ann. § 13.139(13) (Supp.

1963)], and Washington [Wash. Rev. Code §§78.52.330-.460

(1961)] merely give

the regulatory authority the power to require unitization to prevent waste without
specifying the degree of acceptance by the ownership interests involved. Louisiana

also provides that the Commissioner of Conservation can unitize for cycling purposes
gas-condensate fields without the consent of any ownership interests [La. Rev. Stat.
§30:5(B) (1950)]. Compulsory unit operations are significant only in Oklahoma,
Louisiana, and Arkansas.
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the operator's. This is a danger which is ever present in all types
of commission regulation. Such arguments are not adequate to
justify an absence of regulation in a particular area, if it can be
shown that the lack of regulation is resulting in substantial social
costs, as seems to be the case in situations in which there is oil
"wasted," i.e., not recovered, because of failure to unitize. It should
be noted that there are substantial legal problems encountered in
attempting to write a compulsory unitization law for yet-to-bedeveloped properties.
CONCLUSION
The state authorities charged with shaping and administering
oil conservation regulations are faced with a situation today for
which no easy solutions can be found. In fact, it is likely that there
exist no truly adequate solutions at all. If all the changes in regulations suggested here were made, and this seems highly unlikely if
not an impossibility, would we then have solved our problems? The
answer must be an emphatic no. The best that can be said for these
reforms is that they would start us in the right direction so that
conservation goals would be better achieved in the future than is
true currently or in the recent past. It is impossible to escape the
overcapacity situation which is a product of the past. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to have proper well spacing or proper allocation
formulas in fields which have already been developed. These things
can only be achieved in fields developed in the future. Overcapacity
will be with us for many years to come. In this we have no choice.
We do have some choice in how the burdens created by overcapacity
will be borne; and we do have some choice in how future producing
capacity will be developed. It is in these areas that the challenges to
regulators lie.

